

Africa in the global political economy at the end of the millenium: what implications for politics and policies? (The Politics of Economic Integration in Africa)

West **Africa** is becoming the symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental, and social stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real "strategic" danger Disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation- states and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security firms, and international drug cartels are now most tellingly demonstrated through a West African prism.(1)

The notion of **Africa's** marginalization, while stemming from the concrete reality of super-power disengagement, is facile...a variety of NGOs have directed international concern to sub-Saharan **Africa**.(2)

[S]tructural adjustment policies of the Bank's chosen variety constitute in very poor countries a gratuitous obstruction, just as in the NICs they constitute a welcome acceleration, of the policy evolution...in very poor countries, privatisation and removal of infant industry protective structures are at best an irrelevance. True structural adjustment requires the building up of the country's export sectors and associated infrastructure, which in the short term may require more rather than less state intervention.(3)

[I]t is of vital importance to define an updated agenda for [the Non- Aligned Movement] NAM which aims to secure a more favourable international economic environment for national development efforts in individual countries in the South.

Paradoxically, structural adjustment programmes have been defeated by the very environment against which they were intended as a defence.(4)

The advent of political liberalization, constitutional change and competitive electoral regimes, however salutary, do not ensure transition to sustainable democratic rule on the continent. Democracy will stand or fall on the creation of new political communities and the quality of participation in liberalizing polities.(5)

Africa at the end of the twentieth century - a century which saw the continent being captured and colonised and then decolonised and downgraded - is neither marginal nor central in the postbipolar "order." Further, it is also neither homogeneous nor integrated. Rather, after a "lost decade" of "internal" difficulties - declines, disasters and droughts - and "external" conditionalities - from economic to political and now onto ecological and strategic - **Africa** cannot be ignored.(6)

Although, unlike many other Southern continents, **Africa** contains no Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs in Southeast Asia)(7) or even near-NICs (also Southeast Asia along with Latin America and, possibly early in the next century, China and India). Its political economies belong largely to Fourth (Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia) and Fifth (Liberia,

Somalia, Sudan, Zaire) Worlds rather than Third (Botswana, Mauritius, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and, at least historically, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Senegal),(8) thus transcending any lingering colonial or regional let alone contemporary "political" or ideological typologies. I elaborate on Africa's unenviable place in the avant garde of global trends in the first part below, turning to possible continental and international policy responses in the second.

I. Contexts

i) Africa and Globalization. "Africa" represents one possible, albeit unattractive, scenario for the twenty-first century, although Kaplan's stereotyping (see above quote) overstated the case, and the ensuing mid-decade debate got diverted by a variety of emotions and sensitivities.(9) Nevertheless, albeit less dramatically and rhetorically, there will continue to be inequalities, insecurities and conflicts on the continent. These will pose profound, inescapable extracontinental implications in terms of environment, finance, informal sectors, migration, etc. In short, Africa's emerging responses to the exponential pressures of globalization and fragmentation, regionalisms and restructuring do constitute something of a weather-vane: which forces will dominate development directions there and elsewhere into the next millennium?(10)

Indeed, Africa in the 1990s, as initially in the 1900s and 1960s and again in the 1980s, constitutes a massive socio-political "experiment" : originally incorporated for the "new" industrial world's raw materials; then decolonization following World War II and the subsequent post-war boom; and, finally, in the 1980s, the "neo-liberal" world of the international financial institutions' (IFIs) ubiquitous structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) almost everywhere. In the early 1980s, the latter initially confirmed and defined its marginal role in the New International Division of Labour (NIDL), which was subsequently reinforced in the late-1980s by the end of both the Cold War and any lingering possibilities of creative "non-alignment" in the New International Division of Power (NIDP).(11)

By the middle of the 1990s Africa's political economy and political culture have been transformed: from economic and political colonies, to political without economic independence, and now economic "liberalization" with an increasing range of political conditionalities. In short, the characteristic centralized post-independence one-party state structure has been transformed by a decade of economic "reforms" and subsequent moves towards parallel political liberalization, no matter how incompatible in practice.(12)

Thus, by the end of the 1990s we may anticipate, through extrapolation from established contemporary trends, that Africa's development achievements and prospects will continue to be unenviable, with one or two exceptions. That is, minimal "human" or "sustainable" development almost everywhere, with the possible exception of one or two individual IFI "success stories" - from Ghana and Kenya in the late-1980s to Mozambique and Uganda in the early-1990s - and at least some of the region of Southern Africa, largely depending on the content and pace of change in post-apartheid South Africa. That is, still primarily Fourth and Fifth World with only a minority of aspiring Third World political economies to

attract direct foreign investment (DFI); the latter now including Northern portfolio investment funds along with Japanese and NIC capital.(13)

At the global level, any situating of the "new" **Africa** has to take into account the following sets of novel variables, even if these may be essentially Northern in genesis and sometimes transitional in character(14):

a) new states from the regions of the Baltic and Turkic states and ex-Yugoslavia to Eritrea and Somaliland on the continent itself;

b) new relations, particularly globalization and regionalization, including differentiation, especially between and within states, notably the rise of the NICs, near-NICs and "middle powers" like China and India and decline of Fourth and Fifth Worlds;

c) new institutions including the diversity of intergovernmental (e.g. G-7, -15 and -24), transnational (especially MNCs, Southern as well as Northern, and NGOs, which include religious and "ethnic" communities, such as the Inuit Circumpolar Conference around the Arctic), and regional organizations (e.g. AEC, AFTA, NAFTA, PECC and SADC)(15);

d) new issues from environment, gender and informal sectors to crime, debt, democracy, drugs, emergencies, flexibilization, migration, ozone-depletion, satellite TV, viruses, etc;

e) new approaches at the levels of both analysis and praxis, which stretch all the way from resilient neo-classicism to unsettling post-modernism, including revived realism and dependency plus forms of feminism and "new" institutionalism, "new" functionalism and "new" regionalism.(16)

In short, both African and non-African state and non-state policy- makers have to recognize that at the turn of the millennium, the continent's development, foreign and security agenda (see II. ii-iv below) has been quite redefined in the NIDL/P.(17)

a) transformed states, especially state-economy/society relations, with special reference to rise of civil society, demise of middle class and appearance of "new" ethnic-national or regional structures; i.e. second or third generation (see II.v below);

b) transformed capitalisms, now centred around Pacific as well as Atlantic Rims, including attention to related factors of flexibilization, feminization, service sectors, post-industrialism/Fordism, etc.,(18)

c) transformed strategic context, from bipolar inter-state stalemate to multiple new security threats, such as ecology, migration, drugs and nuclear smuggling, religious fundamentalisms, viruses etc.(19)

Reflective of its renewed role as social "laboratory" for strategies of economic and political change, **Africa** at the end of the twentieth century is increasingly characterized by the following central features, which any extra-continental policy - state and non-state alike -

should begin to take into account:

- a) internationalization of the state in terms of relations and directions of economy, polity, society, ideology, ecology, population, culture, etc;
- b) diminution of the state given cumulative impoverishment, internationalization, adjustment, communication, etc;
- c) erosion of democracy as national level of decreasing salience given SAPs, etc., producing the irony of democratic practices being advocated and advanced when they are simultaneously becoming less efficacious;
- d) rise of sub- and supra-state actors from internal as well as international "civil society" in response to novel challenges and opportunities as the state declines;
- e) onto new "mixed" actor coalitions to respond to the dialectic of globalization and fragmentation, which may yet come to challenge and even supercede the established neo-liberal hegemony in terms of labor/employment, gender, ecology, democracy, peace/security, etc.;
- f) popular pressures for sustainable democracy at all levels, from sub- to supra-national - i.e. from local communities/NGOs to non- and inter-governmental organizations at regional and global levels - in part in response to continued tendencies towards authoritarianism, corporatism, anarchy, inequalities, etc.;
- g) redefinitions of foreign and security policy in terms of both actors (i.e. not just states) and contents (i.e. new "high politics" issues of crime/drugs, ecology, migration/refugees, gender, etc.) leading towards "popular" responses along with "new" functionalisms and regionalisms (see below); i.e. defined by communities rather than only by governments.

In brief, rather than being peripheral, in terms of confronting the new range of global issues, **Africa** may be in the avant garde, in part because it is especially vulnerable. Hence, the considerable relevance of extra-continental actors, both state and non-state, recognizing such new realities and responding to them with appropriate creativity and sensitivity.(20)

ii) **Africa** and Regionalization. Related to the preceding features of global contexts, among the central clusters of "African" issues now facing analysts, activists and policy-makers on and around the continent are:

- a) redefinition and diminution of the African state given the interrelated pressures of globalization/regionalisms and structural adjustment/change, including recognition of varieties of political economies/cultures (i.e. Third to Fifth Worlds);
- b) appreciation of indigenous forms of participation, not just formal, multiparty constitutions and elections, legislatures and regimes, but particularly varieties of African

civil society, including "ethnicity, " despite demise of the continent's embryonic middle class over the last decade;

c) recognition of the potential yet also limits of the market, especially in an historically over-regulated set of economies, including job- creation and basic welfare provision plus financial legislation especially related to privatization, new stock markets, oligopolies, etc.;

d) reaction to the increasing tensions between pressures for and against democratization, centered on the new space for civil society but continued place of militaries, militia, old guards (and now gangs and private security agencies), etc.;

e) admission that economic and political liberalizations may not always be compatible in practice as sustained economic reforms, especially cutbacks in basic needs, essential infrastructures and formal employment may necessitate strong rather than weak regimes for effective "reform" interventions;

f) responsiveness to the dilemmas of demands for ethnic political autonomy given that larger economic units remain imperative for the continent in an era of globalization;

g) appreciation of the roots of "crises" so that post-bipolar conflicts are neither ignored, or simplified; i.e. contemporary struggles reflect a mix of both internal and external, long- and short-term causes, which any responses must include in terms of peacekeeping/-making, NGO emergency and recovery relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation of infrastructures and institutions, etc.;

h) self-consciousness over variety of "new" interventions now "legitimated" in the NIDL/P, from SAPs and peace-keeping to emergency relief, election and human rights monitoring, NGO links, ecological, gender and religious organisations, global culture and media, debt rating agencies, etc.;

i) readiness to recognize and cooperate with "new" African regionalisms and (re)emerging regional powers, both of which constitute tentative responses to the rise of regionalisms globally, especially EU and NAFTA and the demise of bipolar logic; i.e. regional economic and strategic "powers" which may come to constitute a continental "concert" given the disappointments of the OAU and the decline of NAM.

Given such a complex set of contexts, which are reflected in diverse analytic as well as policy, diplomatic and/or strategic, perspectives, it is rather too simple to accept that the continent's position is unrelievedly marginal. While in broad economic, strategic and diplomatic terms such an assertion may be supportable, as indicated in the opening citations, in a few sectors and for a few interests it is quite central: notably, environment (e.g. biodiversity, desertification, ivory, oceans, tropical forests) and the "development set" (including Anglo America' s now continent-wide gold and diamond concessions and Lonrho's maverick capitalism), respectively. To be sure, it is undeniable that **Africa' s** place in the global political economy is less central than that of any other region. Nevertheless, the continent is increasingly recognized to be crucial to world biodiversity and "green

tourism," both intensifying in a post-industrial, "leisure" society. Moreover, as other parts of the South grow, sometimes exponentially, so aid is concentrated on the continent, especially ODA conditionalities and NGO activities. Thus any excessive over-generalization about Africa's marginalization is misplaced and misleading.(21)

Indeed, the late-1990s may constitute an unexpectedly promising period for Africa's redirection and renaissance as the hegemonic position of neo-conservative policies is increasingly under challenge everywhere. The continent's "lost" or "adjustment" decade coincided with and reflected that of neo-classical ascendancy in most of the North. Yet, both adjustment and monetarist projects of the 1980s, with their mutual preoccupation with debt, have been confronted by seemingly insuperable problems in the 1990s. The "triumphalism" attendant on the ending of both Cold and Gulf Wars has rapidly yielded to pessimism even defeatism as liberalization in the East has gone awry and in the South is stagnant, except possibly in parts of China, India and Southeast Asia. The combination of prolonged recession in the West with protracted depression in the East should give pause to the IFIs around their 50th anniversaries about the appropriateness of structural adjustment, especially given the still unhelpful global context, other than perhaps in the "model flying geese" of Southeast Asia.(22)

In short, the late-1990s. may constitute an unanticipated conjuncture for Africa to escape from the dictates of the adjustment "paradigm." Notwithstanding contemporary claims about the successes of capitalism and democracy, the realities at the end of the millennium are more mixed: from structural rather than cyclical change in the North to incremental disintegration in much of the East. The ideological self- confidence associated with neo-conservatism in the 1980s has evaporated, leaving behind beleaguered regimes and endangered infrastructures. The escalation of complex problems and the absence of effective responses are apparent in the diversity of actors and reactions: from the fragmentation of states to the proliferation of groups in "civil society" (see II.v below) - both of which increasingly include a rich variety of types - by contrast to earlier over-confidence in the "market."

The present window of opportunity may then allow Africa to escape from the problematic dictates of adjustment. In part because of complications in the East as well as a spreading revisionist, sceptical mood, the West is divided and preoccupied, lacking the markets, finances and stamina for sustained adjustment conditionalities to be met. And if Northern resources do not match African reforms, to say nothing of expectations, then leverage is reduced so further slippage is inevitable, even rational. Given the West's resilient recession, reflective of the continued rejection of Keynesian measures, which is exacerbated by the elusiveness of the "peace dividend" and demands from the East, it cannot meet the terms of any adjustment pact.

So despite its manifold dilemmas, the South, particularly various levels and types of civil society groups, might seize the current conjuncture - not a brave "new world order," more a grave disorder - for its own purposes: to recapture the global agenda for sustainable human development/security.(23) It may begin to escape from interventionist conditionalities and redefine its own development directions, with profound global

implications. Its continuing, interrelated moves towards an African Economic Community and a continental peace-making structure - the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, including a Peace Fund and Conflict Management Centre - both of which transcend postindependence shibboleths, point in such a direction of African reassertion and renaissance following the end of both Bretton Woods and Cold War eras.(24)

This conjuncture might enable Africa to return to some of its earlier, considered yet still-born proposals for regional restructuring and revitalization, now reflected in plans for economic communities to succeed ECOWAS, SADCC and PTA, such as SADC and COMESA.(25) In particular, these need to be revised and reinforced to include positive elements from regional civil society: business associations, cooperatives, interest groups, media, NGO coalitions, political parties, religious organizations, trade unions, etc. Such a challenge will not be easy given myriad diversions such as civil wars, droughts and debt negotiations. Yet, given the changed global context already identified above, such a conjuncture is unlikely to be repeated soon if it is not seized now. Indeed, as suggested below, far less attractive and attainable Kaplanesque scenarios may occur otherwise.(26)

Somewhat unexpectedly, despite the objective difficulties in South- North relations - proliferating unilateral conditionalities and non- trade barriers (NTBs) rather inconclusive and unhelpful GATT/WTO Uruguay Round, stagnant ODA and DFI flows except to the East (s), diminished salience of Lome Conventions, emergence of "new security" issues like drugs and migration, etc. - the late 1990s may yet facilitate a novel development contract. It is increasingly irrefutable that growing interdependence requires communication and redistribution. Africa has something to contribute to such a mutual dialogue, and even some leverage if it does not occur: disregard of "ecological conditionalities, " for example. In brief, with the impending failure of the purist neo-conservative "counter-revolution" a return to more humane, long- term, sustainable development policies and practices may not only be desirable but now also possible.(27)

The more ambiguous place of Africa is confirmed in the NIDP when security is redefined - from "collective" towards "common" and now "human"(28) (see II.iii below) - to include issues of crime, disease, drugs, informal sectors, migration etc. If the continent's economic and ecological condition continue to deteriorate then it will come to pose more of a threat to the North and to some more developed parts of the South. Most of these "transnational" phenomena do not stop at boundaries; all of them flow across official borders in both South and North, including the presence and roles of "diasporas" concentrated in Europe and North America. If neither Africa's historical statecentric policies nor its current market "reforms" are efficacious, then it is likely to generate not just lower real incomes and living standards, but also more external - to both state and continent - threats. Un- and under-employment encourage semi- or illegal activities that impact at global as well as continental, regional and local levels; this is hardly "marginalization."

The unanticipated appearance of several such interrelated strands of revisionism in East and West, North and South at the end of the century in both relations and prescriptions

has profound implications for African studies and policies, that are still only beginning to be recognized, and then initially more by consultants and NGOs than either academics or officials. I now stand corrected myself, given some of the rather simplistic and optimistic elements which pervaded some of my own work in the second half of the 1970s which did not anticipate the impending neo-liberal counter-attack.(29) To be sure, some parts of the continent had already begun to discard worn-out notions of one-man regimes and one-party states, in part as aspects of exponential "reform" conditionalities. But, outside of South(ern) Africa, appreciation of the ripples from first East Asia and then Eastern Europe was tardy.(30)

The continent had been through revisionist periods before, such as rethinking whether political independence led inevitably to economic development (1960s) or whether political liberation led inevitably to socialist nirvanas (1970s). However, the post-war "takeoff" of Japan and the NICs in East Asia and then the post-Cold War disintegration of the Eastern bloc were quite disorienting, especially for those regimes which had become dependent on "state socialist" security, ideology or trade. Likewise, the impending moderation of "market forces" in the West is likely to pose immense problems of credibility and disarray in the majority of countries which have come to concur with adjustment terms.

Some elements in civil society had anticipated at least some parts of such a demarche and began to design and advance alternative directions. But we should not expect under-resourced NGOs to rush to the rescue of unimaginative regimes in terms of either programme/project delivery or policy debates and directions given their own historical marginalization (see II.v below). Nevertheless, civil society, particularly at the regional level, is one of very few sources of creative response, both conceptually and organizationally.

In the following sections of the paper, I highlight five central features in the contemporary continent - reformulations of foreign policy; new security and diplomatic relations; continental crises and regional conflicts; new regionalisms and functionalisms; and the tension between burgeoning democratization and creeping corporatism - all of which pose policy challenges and opportunities both on and off the continent.

II. Responses

i) Foreign Policy Reformulated. As elsewhere, African foreign policy is in an unanticipated period of transition, for three interrelated reasons. First, its content is being redefined in the NIDL/P away from orthodox diplomacy and security towards an endless series of negotiations over conditionalities, from debt to democracy and peace- keeping (i.e. Africa as decision-taker rather than -maker). Second, its locus is shifting from state houses and foreign offices to central banks and finance ministries. And third, its hitherto exclusive status is being undermined as relations within civil society multiply outside the purview of official structures: non-governmental and informal sector interactions as well as those of multinational corporations and religious missions? Such transitions are intensifying as adjustment conditionalities come to include political liberalization. Notwithstanding such

fascinating changes and related legacies of the "adjustment decade" of the 1980s, the analysis of comparative foreign (and defense/security) policy has remained rather underdeveloped in Africa, especially in regard to its many small, Fourth or Fifth World states.(32)

The essential context of such foreign policy over the last decade has been characterized by a dialectic between centrifugal tendencies in terms of policy - spreading structural adjustment programmes, and centripetal trends in terms of economy - disparate performances in terms of adjustment conditionalities, environmental conditions, and economic results. Ironically, the continent is becoming more unequal despite similar economic and political conditionalities and liberalizations because of uneven amounts of external assistance, investment and exchange. In short, ironically, the new intervention of IFIs has created homogeneity in economic policy yet heterogeneity in political economy, with profound implications for inter- and intra-state inequity, instability and conflict, an inflammable mix for inter-African relations in particular, especially given contemporary reformulations of security and diplomacy.(33)

ii) New Security/Diplomacy. Orthodox analysis of security/diplomacy in Africa as elsewhere in the Third World has continued to be based largely on traditional realist as well as statist assumptions which emphasized great powers and Cold War on the one hand, and national resources and capabilities on the other. Such a classic, bipolar, "high political" and crisis-oriented strategic perspective is quite uncritical and conservative, tending towards dependence: Africa as target and arena for extra-continental powers. It is also static and ahistoric, downplaying shifts in both global and continental hierarchies.(34)

However, such a traditional approach in the 1980s had already begun to be revised by a few analysts at the frontiers of the school to incorporate novel factors such as economy, ecology and food; i.e. security expanded to include new conceptions of non-lethal or non-violent "high" politics. Thus, from such a revisionist perspective, derived nonetheless from realist roots, conflict in Africa is no longer treated as only a function of strategic issues but also of new concerns such as development, environment and habitat; in short, Basic Human Needs (BHN). This reflects a global trend towards treating issues of economy and ecology as crucial, symbolized by the Brandt and Brundtland Commissions, at the beginning and end of the last decade, respectively: from collective to common and now "human" security. This in turn has led to the reconceptualization of related phenomena, such as economic or environmental rather than merely strategic or political "refugees." So contemporary regional conflicts in Africa may have distinctive indigenous roots increasingly unrelated to extra- continental factors: post-bipolar struggles.

By contrast to such a revisionist extension of orthodox strategic studies for and in Africa - in which symptoms are treated rather than structures and social aggregates - a more radical reformulation has been advanced. In the African case, strategy would thereby be redefined as "state" or "regime" or "presidential" rather than "international" security. Threats would be reconceived as internal, excluded or impoverished groups - as well as external. This more fundamental reformulation treats security issues as defined by the positions and perceptions of the particular class in power which claims to articulate "national security"

concerns but in fact advances fractional if not individual interests.

If the state in **Africa** is shrinking then increasingly foreign relations will be among non-state actors, from informal financial exchanges to established professional associations. Governments may still go to war over boundaries and booty, as diversion or aggrandisement, but most cross-border interactions will be among companies and communities. Thus, in the late- or post-adjustment period, foreign policy will be increasingly "transnational," i.e. involving non-official actors in a routine manner outside the purview of the diminished state. This will pose challenges for both diplomats and students of diplomacy, leading away from realism over diplomacy and security and towards revisionism about economy and ecology. It may also advance the democratization of foreign policy: no longer either elitist or statist, but rather open debate about "low politics."

The next section treats major emerging threats at the regional level to this rather optimistic vision for the continent, balancing this with innovative regionalist and functionalist responses on the continent, that both recognize and seek to incorporate contemporary issues in both NIDL and NIDP. The concluding section deals with the democracy/corporatist stand-off: all salient factors in redesigning both official and non-governmental policies.

iii) Continental Crises and Regional Conflicts. The continent's contemporary developmental difficulties are inseparable from and have been exacerbated by the intensification of social and strategic conflicts, a "new" global issue-area in which it is hardly marginal. It has already been argued in revisionist scholarship and admitted by many concerned that some if not most of the apparently "ecological" challenges, "ethnic" conflicts and "religious" crusades have in fact been either caused or worsened by such tensions. Likewise, the imperative of structural adjustment, which has only just begun to be directed at the military, was intensified by ongoing internal and regional conflicts, from the Horn to Southern **Africa**. But if economic and political liberalization are rarely compatible or simultaneous, adjustment and rehabilitation or reconstruction are even less so.(35)

Similarly, until recently, the need to compromise with extra- (e.g. great) powers and with intra-African (e.g. Libya, Nigeria and apartheid South **Africa**) threats was in large measure a function of regime, food and ecological imperatives. The balance of causality in this range of factors changes over time, notably in recent years in the direction of less extra-continental but more extra-state factors' salience, especially in terms of intra-African relations. This is particularly so in regional conflict if somewhat less so in regional cooperation; i.e. implications of NIDP rather than NIDL.

The intensification of inequalities on the continent both within and between states, now in part because of the uneven impacts of adjustment, has provided some of the causes of "new" conflicts. Thus, in addition to the range of recent orthodox "foreign" interventions by African (e.g. South **Africa**), middle (e.g. France), and superpower regimes (e.g. US) (and, historically, Libya, Cuba and the USSR) there are novel forms of "intervention" such as peace-keeping/-making; another area in which the continent is central rather than

marginal. Together, these have alternately reinforced and undermined, not to say diverted, many African governments either directly or through the use of associates or puppets, including in the contemporary period cross-conditionalities.(36)

Further, the role of militaries in the accumulation of African debt has hardly been investigated, although their competitive, acquisitive and spend-thrift tendencies cannot be denied, with implications for scarce foreign exchange. Notwithstanding down-sizing in most budget lines, expenditures on coercive equipment and proliferating security forces - from secret police to paramilitaries - seem to increase almost exponentially, in part to ensure compliance with socially unwelcome SAP measures.(37)

In the post-bipolar and post-apartheid period, it is possible that African armies will be less necessary, i.e. assuming that a major cause sustaining them was extra-continental involvements, ideological, financial and material. Conversely, given widespread opposition to adjustment conditionalities, they may become more necessary in internal affairs, maintaining order for isolated and unpopular regimes which have few resources other than coercion-through which to maintain control. So the caution of UNDP's Human Development Report 1991 is still justified: "A peace dividend (in the South) is some way off because peace there is more elusive. The Third World has not been involved in the recent East-West negotiations, or in disarmament talks or in the design for a new framework for world' peace. Nor does the Third World have any of its own institutionalized forums for a discussion of military expenditure." (38)

Thus, notwithstanding current superficial yet problematic (see concluding section below) moves towards formal multi-party democracy, there is likely to be a proliferation of unorthodox, non-formal threats to incumbents from alienated and impoverished groups. So the continent is likely to experience a tension between democratic pressures and conditionalities reinforced by novel guerrilla formations on the one hand and discredited and diminished but not yet defeated or deflated regimes on the other. Hence, the ambiguities of the debates over "African democracy"(39): fragile? precarious? unconsolidated?

As suggested further below, regionalism in Africa is also likely to be characterized by two contradictory tendencies in the 1990s: imperative of economic cooperation and incidence of political dominance. In an era of globalization, the former is ever more essential for development, given the fragmentation of the continent, and may be rendered compatible with adjustment programmes if liberalization is directed towards regional rather than global exchange; it is also likely to become more informal and possibly more democratic in character as communities respond to adjustment conditions. The latter is a function of both continental inequalities and declining global constraints: less direct, unilateral super- or great-power interventions (i.e. other than multilateral structural or peacebuilding ones) and more disinterest, facilitating regional hegemons, whether sub-imperial or not.(40)

The "peace-making" roles of Nigeria in Liberia, Senegal in the Gambia, the "new" South Africa in Lesotho or Zimbabwe in Mozambique may become more commonplace in the post-bipolar era. This seems to be the case whether the aspiring regional powers are

themselves in some state of disarray, in part because their regional targets or dependents are even more so. In any event, they may reinforce each other's claims to regional dominance through a continental "concert" of powers, replacing bipolar logic with African structures; not a formal Pan-African "High Command" but rather a coalition of would-be hegemons,(41) now legitimized through an "African" rapid deployment force?(42)

To be sure, regional cooperation and regional domination are not always compatible, although both are present in typical subcontinental arrangements. Given the global trend towards economic and, to a lesser extent, political regionalization, Africa must become more integrated by the end of the 1990s than before, otherwise it will be ever more marginalized. Effective regional units, both economic and strategic, are sine qua non for striking interregional bargains in both NIDL and NIDP. Without them Africa will be further marginalized in any "new world order." (43)

iv) New Regionalisms/Functionalisms. The current, unanticipated economic and strategic conjuncture NIDL - now joined by NIDP - provides an alternative, indeed compelling, occasion for redirecting not only development but also foreign policy away from global chimeras and towards "new" regional communities. Such reorientation would reinforce current OAU and ECA inclinations and orientations, such as the Peace Fund/Conflict Management Centre and African Economic Community, and could also serve to recognize informal economies and encourage informal polities: civil societies at regional and/or continental levels. The dynamic of regional exchange given economic crises and conditionalities is already a reality which sustains many local political economies whether through the transnational movement of capital, commodities, currencies, drugs and/or labour.(44)

Whether even diminished African regimes can come to accept a more modest international posture in which non-state relations - from NGOs and civil societies or ethnic nations to informal sectors and environmental communities - are facilitated even encouraged remains to be seen. But the decade of the 1990s, in theory the run-up to a continental economic community,(45) at least offers an occasion for reconsideration and reevaluation: "second wave" regionalist initiatives, especially as reflected in COMESA, SADC and moves to revive the East African Community.(46)

As such, African as well as extra-African foreign policies(47) may come to be both revisionist and realist before the end of the century, with promising possibilities in terms of revived and sustainable development: onto new forms of integration and industrialization for the next century appropriate for diminished yet democratic states and expanded markets and civil societies.(48)

Similarly, the continent's new post-1980s agenda opens up prospects for new functionalist arrangements, such as regarding tropical forests, ivory and diamond trades, drought management, refugee repatriation, water distribution, oil and natural gas pipelines, container transportation, cellular telephones, computer networks, satellite television, regional capital and stock markets, etc.; i.e. cross-border cooperation over "technical" matters among non-state organizations, potentially deepening regional

arrangements including civil society. Such tendencies often come together in regional peace-keeping/-making and confidence-building measures - the new peace-building alliance between blue berets/helmets and multiple NGOs - which have to take account of and incorporate real political economy factors, including latent if not overt authoritarian or anarchic tendencies. In short, can SAPs and peace-keeping be rendered less incompatible.(49)

v) Democratic Development versus Corporatist Coalitions. I conclude this essay with a cautionary glance at a particular but usually overlooked dichotomy: that between the now-fashionable "democratic development" and the new threat of "corporatism" or other forms of authoritarianism. These may be more likely than anarchy given the prevailing adjustment paradigm, despite the latter's idealistic "governance" associates.(50)

Africa at the mid-1990s confronts a contradictory set of options or conditions: liberalization and/or contraction in both economics and politics.(51) Given its wide range of political economies and political cultures, some of **Africa** may move in several of these directions at once. The primary tension which is emerging is between economic contraction and political liberalization, a combination which is rather ominous for incumbent regimes, which might prefer the alternative mix of economic expansion and political contraction; indeed, that was the underlying basis of the post-colonial "African socialist" model. The contrary condition of economic contraction is quite familiar by now, induced by a mix of external, ecological and internal realities and policies. But the political correlates are more elusive and problematic: regime inclinations to dominate and external pressures to democratize.

The emergence of democracy along with debt as a leading global policy or ideological concept has encouraged not only formal constitutional changes, national conventions and multi-party elections. It has also facilitated the expansion of global NGO networks and the popularization of the notion of civil society. Such "new" social movements tend to cluster around a set of contemporary issues, from environmentalism and feminism to fundamentalism, both Christian and Moslem. Such energetic non-state actors now confound regime authority, demanding accountability and transparency. They are encouraged, even emboldened, to do so not only by external conditions but also by internal conditionalities, including peace-building or reconstruction, especially related to Fourth and Fifth Worlds. But orthodox governance conditionalities may not be enough to sustain democracy, continuous involvement of local and global civil society is imperative. International concern with "human rights" as well as human needs, women and development, and sustainable development, has grown since the U.S. presidency of Jimmy Carter. It has also developed away from notions of formal democracy towards those of democratic development or popular participation.(52)

By contrast, given the state-society dialectic, many regimes' natural inclination is to look for arrangements which ensure their longevity. The adjustment project is permissive, even supportive, of the rise of a national bourgeoisie - a crucial yet tenuous element in any process of sustainable democracy - alongside somewhat endangered bureaucratic, military, political and technocratic fractions. Therefore, incumbent leaders have sought, in

a period of shrinking resources, to replace the corruptive tendencies of cooption with those of corporatism. They can no longer afford the expansive (and expensive!) gestures of patronage; instead, they have begun to rely on the less predictable but also less expensive (i.e. more "efficient") arrangements of corporatism.

Corporatism consists merely of a set of structured social relations which includes only certain major groups in the political economy. Normally it revolves around some understanding between state and economy, particularly labor and both national and international capitals. But it may also include connections with other major social institutions in civil society already identified, such as religions and universities, media and interest groups, professional associations and NGOs, women's and youth groups.(53)

Corporatism as analysis and praxis may have its roots in Europe and Latin America of the 1930s, but it has since spread to embrace non- fascist and non-Catholic regions and regimes; e.g. distinct arrangements at different times among state, capital and labor in Australia, Britain, Canada, France and Sweden in the post-war period. Much recent attention within this genre has focused on Latin America, particularly Peronist Argentina, where a useful variety of sub-categories has been isolated, such as authoritarian or bureaucratic corporatisms, often including military and police units. The approach and formula would seem to have resonance in the contemporary political economy of NICs and near- NICs in Southeast Asia.(54)

Surprisingly, corporatism as perspective or practice has received minimal attention in Africa to date. There has been some recognition that it helps to explain settler and postsettler states in South Africa or Zimbabwe. But in general, a concern for trilateral or triangular relations among state, capital and labour has not been apparent, despite parallel, even compatible, notions of authoritarianism or exclusion, Bonapartism and commandism. Nyang'oro and Shaw(55) attempted to begin to rectify this oversight by encouraging comparative analysis of a variety of corporatisms in contemporary Africa. The continuing unfolding of myriad social implications of adjustment encourages such revisionist analytic direction.

Moreover, corporatism at the level of the state may not be incompatible with limited pluralism at the level of society, or market forces at the level of the economy, and formal and informal forms of political economy particularly in a period of adjustment. More formal national- level arrangements among state, capital and labor may be compatible with more informal sub-national activities of cooperatives, ethnic communities, interest groups, religions, NGOs, etc.; i.e. compatible forms of postadjustment "self-reliance." But such an understanding would require maturity on both sides - the state does not need to monopolize all social relations and, conversely, social groups do not automatically threaten the state; that is, a new internal division of labor and powers, compatible with international changes and contexts. All too few African leaders have been prepared to countenance such real devolution and decentralization, at least until the second decade of adjustments. So stable state-society relations are likely to be undermined by regime insecurity or social irrepressibility.

Such tendencies toward regime apprehension - even xenophobia - may be reinforced when differences within civil society are recognized: the variety of types of NGOs, media, etc. A "second wave" of more skeptical, revisionist analysis (if not "second generation") is beginning to complicate previous homogeneous, idealistic assumptions about such social movements, resulting in typologies of global to local NGOs, which are subdivided in terms of whether they are more concerned with project delivery than with social transformation. They also vary significantly in terms of size, scope, governance, finance, ideology, accountability, links with national/external states and with regional/global organizations, etc. Even if allegations of INGO imperialisms or interventions are exaggerated, the opportunities for NGO expansionism have been increased by both SAPs and peace-keeping.(56)

If the manifold claims of reinvigorated, heterogeneous civil society cannot be satisfied by diminished states and economies, then a return to corporatist arrangements - involving a rich variety of regimes, companies, NGOs, etc. - may be inevitable. The familiar cycle of one-party/military rule may thus be replaced by a multiparty/corporatist one, reflective of interrelated changes in national and global political economies. The presence and place of corporatism in the South as well as North - from Third (South Africa/Zimbabwe) to Fourth (Uganda/Zambia) Worlds - are an overlooked phenomenon which may yet become more familiar as regimes seek to manage often incompatible political (e.g. democratization) and economic (e.g. deindustrialization) "reforms," let alone peace- building and rehabilitation. In short, corporatisms may constitute a useful framework within which to manage tensions arising from uneven, sometimes incompatible, rates of economic and political change. The apparent trend towards unilineal, official, national "multipartyism" should not be exaggerated. Economic and political liberalization indeed have profound political and social implications, well beyond the purview of the Bank and Fund.(57)

Reflective of the revisionist period and mood, who and what will define civil society, democracy and development in Africa at the start of the next century? I am encouraged that such a question can at least be posed when in previous decades responses were taken for granted, such as in the African ("socialist") project. In particular, given the resilience of the state, its subjection and reaction to continuous democratic pressures are crucial, particularly the democratic processes of accountability, responsibility, transparency, etc. I have suggested elsewhere that unless ecological, gender, and informal sector elements are recognized and prioritized in any foreseeable democratic formulation then sustainable, human development will remain elusive because the paradigm of adjustment will otherwise prevail as it did throughout the lost decade of the 1980s.(58) In the 1990s the complexities of the NIDL and NIDP identified above - global and continental variables and issues - certainly reinforce such problematic trends, exacerbated particularly in complex peace-making situations. Hence, the imperative of truly innovative policy and political struggles and alternatives which democratic pressures facilitate and require, but which authoritarian and corporatist regime machinations are still always ready to divert and dilute, thus the ongoing dialectics of African adjustment into the next century.

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